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Introduction
The estimation of elasticities of taxable income with respect to marginal income tax rates has long attracted the interest of economists (see Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz, 2012 , for a literature review), since the elasticity of taxable income can be used to estimate the excess burden of income taxation (Feldstein, 1995 (Feldstein, , 1999 Chetty, 2009 ). However, the empirical estimation of the taxable income elasticity in the presence of tax avoidance and tax evasion is challenging. For example, le Maire and Schjerning (2013) show that intertemporal income shifting substantially reduces taxable income elasticities. In this paper, I empirically identify the cross-base tax elasticities of other income sources with respect to marginal labor income taxes.
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Individuals can generate income in the form of labor income and capital income such as capital gains. In many countries, capital gains are taxed at a separate tax schedule (e.g., the United States, Germany, Finland, Norway) and often at a fixed proportional tax rate (Finland, Japan, and Sweden). The literature on capital gains typically focuses on the direct effect of capital gains taxation. The resulting "lock-in effect" has been documented in theoretical 2 and empirical 3 studies. A higher capital gains tax rate reduces the propensity to realize capital gains and reduces the level of capital gains. Despite agreement that capital gains taxes affect individual portfolio decisions (e.g., Feldstein, Slemrod, and Yitzhaki, 1980; Auten and Clotfelter, 1982; Auerbach, 1988; Bergstresser and Poterba, 2002; Ivković, Poterba, and Weisbenner, 2005) , there is no empirical evidence whether capital gains are also sensitive to labor income taxation.
This paper tests the potential cross-base tax sensitivity of capital gains to labor income taxes. If capital gains are taxed at a tax rate that is independent from the marginal tax rate on labor income or income from self-employment, individuals may be responsive to tax See, for example, Constantinides (1983) ; Auerbach (1991) ; Klein (1999) ; Poterba (2002) .
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See, for example, Reese (1998) ; Poterba and Weisbenner (2001) ; Dai et al. (2008) ; Sialm (2009); Jacob (2013) .
1 rate differences between labor and capital income. An increase in the labor income tax rate reduces net-of-tax labor income. In the presence of adjustment costs or hourly constraints (Chetty et al., 2011) , a labor income tax increase reduces consumption while the labor supply remains unchanged. This, in turn, may result in increased capital gains realization activity to maintain the level of consumption. However, if individuals instead increase "on-the-job" leisure (Dickenson, 1999) , capital gains realizations may not respond at all to changes in labor income taxes. In this case, cross-base tax elasticity may reflect a behavioral bias; individuals may perceive capital gains taxes as low compared to labor income tax rates.
I test the potential spillover effect of labor income taxes on capital gains realizations using the comprehensive micro panel data of over 265,000 Swedish individuals over [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . Estimation of this cross-base tax sensitivity involves econometric challenges since, for example, in the United States, long-term capital gains tax rates depend on the level of labor income and vice versa. The Swedish case offers a suitable setting to isolate the effect of labor income taxes on capital gains realizations and to overcome the endogeneity issue where the level of capital gains affects the marginal income tax rate. Since 1991, Sweden has had a dual income tax with progressive tax rates on labor income and income from self-employment.
Capital income such as capital gains are taxed at a separate income schedule at a proportional tax of 30% 4 and there is no variation in capital gains tax rates across individuals. Hence, in the absence of cross-sectional variation in capital gains tax rates, identification of cross-base tax sensitivity stems from variation in labor income tax rates across individuals and over time.
I identify the cross-base tax sensitivity of capital gains realizations with respect to labor income taxes in a regression kink design. I exploit a large kink in the marginal labor income tax rate around which the labor income tax rate increases by 20 percentage points. I sort individuals into bins around the kink and analyze the change in the slope coefficient of total income on capital gains realization activity at the intensive and extensive margins. The critical assumption of this approach-random assignment around the kink-is confirmed. The distribution around the kink is smooth and bunching estimates are insignificant. This is in
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The tax rate was temporarily reduced to 25% in 1992 and 1993 and to 12.5% in 1994. 2 line with the argument of high adjustment costs mitigating the effect of taxes on the labor supply (Chetty et al., 2011) . To study the extensive margin, I use the likelihood of realizing capital gains as a dependent variable. Average realized capital gains are used as a measure of the intensive margin. For both the extensive and intensive margins, the slope coefficient on income significantly increases from below the kink to above the kink. This indicates that taxpayers are (1) more likely to realize capital gains and (2) realize higher capital gains if they are subject to higher labor income tax rates.
The second step is to estimate elasticities using the approach of Auten and Clotfelter (1982) , Burman and Randolph (1994), and Auerbach and Siegel (2000) . The empirical model controls for three lags of income, wealth, socioeconomic characteristics, state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and individual fixed effects. The latter ensure that the identification of tax elasticities stems from changes in marginal income tax rates at the individual level and not from cross-sectional differences that are sticky over time. The inclusion of income and wealth controls for the availability of funds.
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The results suggest that an increase in the labor income tax increases the likelihood of an individual realizing capital gains. This is the opposite result from earlier studies on the elasticity of capital gains income with respect to capital gains taxes. The corresponding elasticity of the likelihood of realizing capital gains with respect to the marginal income tax rate amounts to 0.05. At the intensive margin-measured by the amount of realized capital gain-the elasticity of capital gains with respect to the marginal income tax rate is 0.04; that is, a 1% increase in the marginal tax increases realized capital gains by 0.04%. To put this result into perspective, if a taxpayer goes from the first tax bracket of 31% to the next tax bracket of 51%, the likelihood of realizing capital gains increases by 1 percentage point-4.3%
of the sample mean-and average capital gains increase by 4%. The estimated elasticities are small but statistically significant. They are also in line with small labor supply elasticities and labor income elasticities (Saez, 2010; Chetty et al., 2011; Chetty, 2012; Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz, 2012) . The economic magnitudes of my estimates are also well below estimates for capital gains tax elasticity from other studies that are between -0.5 and -0.9 (e.g., Auten and Clotfelter, 1982; Burman and Randolph, 1994; Auerbach and Siegel, 2000; Daunfeldt, Praski-Ståhlgren, and Rudholm, 2010) . Still, the results suggest that high tax rates in other tax bases incentivize (1) more individuals to realize capital gains and (2) individuals to realize higher capital gains.
Further, I test whether the spillover effect extends to other capital income sources as well.
Using interest income as well as dividend income as dependent variables in the regression kink design, I again find evidence of cross-base tax sensitivities. The corresponding elasticity estimates suggest that a 1% increase in the labor income tax increases interest income by 0.1%.
Similarly, dividend income increases by 0.022%. This indicates that the presence of different tax schedules leads to tax sensitivities across tax bases. One possible explanation, not testable due to data limitations, of this finding is that individuals rebalance their portfolio and include a larger share of dividend-paying stock as well as bonds with higher interest yields in their portfolios. Another explanation for my findings could be income shifting by self-employed and business owners (Pirttilä and Selin, 2011; Alstadsaeter and Jacob, 2013) . However, even when the self-employed are excluded from the sample, the cross-base tax sensitivity of interest income, dividend income, and capital gains is still statistically significant and close to the baseline estimate.
This study contributes to the literature on the elasticity of taxable income with respect to marginal income tax rates (see Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz, 2012 , for a literature review).
The implications of the elasticity of taxable labor income on the deadweight loss of an income tax (Feldstein, 1995 (Feldstein, , 1999 , therefore, are affected not only by tax avoidance and tax evasion (Chetty, 2009) , but also by the cross-base tax sensitivity of capital income to labor income taxes. Taxpayers increase income in other income sources such as capital gains in response to an increase in the labor income tax. This paper also contributes to a large body of empirical work studying the lock-in effect of capital gains taxes (Feldstein, Slemrod, and Yitzhaki, 1980; Auten and Clotfelter, 1982; Burman and Randolph, 1994; Poterba, 1987; Auerbach, 4 1988; Bergstresser and Poterba, 2002; Ivković, Poterba, and Weisbenner, 2005 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the theoretical background. Section 3 presents institutional details and associated data. Section 4 presents the empirical estimation strategy, predictions, and empirical results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Theoretical Analysis of Cross-Base Elasticities
This section illustrates the potential effect of labor income taxes on capital gains realization decisions. In a standard capital gains realization decision model (e.g., Constantinides, 1983), the optimal liquidation policy depends on the capital gains tax rate. Losses are immediately realized and capital gains are deferred. If the tax rate on capital gains tax rates decreases, individuals increase their capital gains realization activity and realize higher capital gains (e.g., Feldstein, Slemrod, and Yitzhaki, 1980; Auten and Clotfelter, 1982; Auerbach, 1988; Bergstresser and Poterba, 2002; Ivković, Poterba, and Weisbenner, 2005; Jacob, 2013 Feldstein, Slemrod, and Yitzhaki, 1980; Auten and Clotfelter, 1982; Burman and Randolph, 1994; Poterba, 1987; Auerbach, 1988; Bergstresser and Poterba, 2002; Ivković, Poterba, and Weisbenner, 2005) . Further, j denotes the fraction of the portfolio that is reallocated. A higher j implies that overall capital gains increase. Similar to overall capital gains, the share of realized capital gains decreases in the capital gains tax rate, that is,
One implicit assumption is that individuals realize gains. This corresponds to empirical evidence on the disposition effect and the tendency to hold losing stocks too long and to sell winning stocks too early (Shefrin and Statman, 1985; Odean, 1998 
where c is consumption and y is unearned income other than capital gains. ∂τ Labor > 0. However, if individuals instead increase on-the-job leisure (Dickenson, 1999) , capital gains realizations may not respond at all to changes in labor income taxes. In other words, once individuals increase on-the-job leisure, an effect of labor income taxes on capital gains should not be observed. Hence, one implication of the labor-leisure model is that cross-base tax elasticity may simply reflect a behavioral bias. Relative to labor income taxes, individuals may perceive capital gains taxes as low and, thus, they increase capital gains realizations.
Institutional Setting and Associated Data

The Swedish Dual Income Tax
In 1991, Sweden implemented a dual income tax (see Agell, Englund, and Södersten, 1996 , for a comprehensive overview on the reform). The dual income tax comprises two tax bases. Earned income, such as labor income or income from self-employment, is taxed at the progressive income tax rate. Marginal tax rates range from about 31% to 56%.
8 There are two kinks in the tax rate schedule. In the regression kink design below, I exploit the first kink, around which the marginal income tax rate increases by 20 percentage points, from 31% to 51%. Since 1991, the tax rate on capital income is 30%; that is, interest income, dividend income, and capital gains are taxed at a rate of 30%, independent of the level of earned income. Between 1992 and 1994, capital gains tax rates were temporarily reduced to 25% and 12.5%, respectively (see Jacob, 2013). Since capital gains tax rates apply similarly to all taxpayers, identification of the tax sensitivity stems from the variation in marginal income tax rates on earned income.
Further, there is no difference in the tax treatment between long-and short-term capital gains since 1991. There is a standard deduction that reduces the marginal tax rate to 0%. I account for this standard deduction when computing the individual's marginal tax rate.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Data
This study is based on a panel data set provided by Statistics Sweden ( Further, the data do not allow identification of the type of asset that is sold. Hence, the 9 Aggregated wealth information is only available above the tax-exempt wealth threshold. This threshold, for example, amounted to 900,000 Swedish kronor (SEK) in 2000.
Dependent and Independent Variables
empirical tests are based on the aggregate of all capital gains realizations of one taxpayer in one fiscal year.
[Insert 
Empirical Results
Non-Parametric Analysis of Cross-Base Tax Sensitivity
The The key assumption of this approach is that the assignment variable, earned income in this case, is randomly distributed around the kink. I test whether this assumption is violated by looking at the distribution of earned income around the kink. Bunching around the kink point would indicate that the assignment is not random. Thus, the approach to identify an effect of labor income taxes on capital gains would be biased. I apply the methodology of Chetty et al. (2011) and estimate the excess mass around the kink point. I vary the range around the kink from SEK 2,000 to SEK 10,000 and obtain excess mass estimates between -0.024 and 0.035. Since these estimates are not significant at any conventional level (t-statistics < 1.12), I conclude that there is no bunching of earned income around the state tax threshold and, most importantly, that the assignment variable is randomly distributed around the kink. This result also implies that labor income is not sensitive to the state tax threshold above which the marginal income tax rate increases from 31% to 51%. This corresponds to the assumption of a fixed labor supplyl in the model section above. Figure 1 presents the distribution of earned income around the kink and supports the insignificant excess mass estimates.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
In general, high-income individuals are more likely to realize capital gains and to realize higher capital gains (e.g., Auerbach and Siegel, 2000) . Therefore, I expect a positive slope of the income bin. In other words, capital gains realization activity increases in income.
This is a general observation, independent of the tax rate increase around the kink. If the labor income tax rate has a positive effect on capital gains realizations, I expect this slope coefficient to be larger if individuals are above the kink. Put differently, high labor income tax rates would (1) increase the likelihood of realizing capital gains and (2) Similarly, Figure 3 shows that the increase in the marginal income tax rate affects the amount of realized capital gains. The slope coefficient increases from 0.1475 (below the kink) to 0.2784 (above the kink), or by 89%. The increase in slope coefficients is significant at the 5% level (t-statistic = 1.98). Again, this implies that, absent of the kink, individuals right of the kink would have realized lower capital gains. In sum, graphical analysis of the kink shows that a higher labor income tax rate has an effect at the extensive margin as well as at the intensive margin of capital gains realizations. In particular, capital gains are realized more often and higher capital gains are realized if the marginal tax rate on labor income increases.
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To test that the increasing penetration of assets for higher-income individuals does not explain this result, I repeat the analysis at pseudo-kinks. When moving the kink SEK 100,000 (SEK 200,000) upward, the slope coefficients of income are similar left and right of these pseudo-kinks.
Empirical Estimation of Cross-Base Elasticity
I next turn to the estimation of cross-base tax elasticities. Empirical models estimating capital gains tax elasticity use measures of permanent and transitory capital gains tax rates (e.g., Auten and Clotfelter, 1982; Burman and Randolph, 1994; Auerbach and Siegel, 2000) .
The key challenge of these models is that the decision to realize capital gains and the level of capital gains affect the marginal capital gains tax rate. Therefore, a compelling estimation requires an instrumental variables approach to obtain "first-dollar" marginal capital gains tax rates.
These empirical challenges do not apply in the setting used in the present paper. The marginal income tax rate on labor income is independent from the level of capital gains.
Hence, the income tax rate is exogenous with respect to the level of realized capital gains and the decision to realize capital gains. 11 I follow the semi-log functional form of Auten and Clotfelter (1982) , Burman and Randolph (1994) , and Auerbach and Siegel (2000), but use the marginal income tax rate on labor income M T R instead of an instrumented capital gains tax rate. To test whether the decision to realize capital gains is affected by cross-base tax sensitivities, I use the following two-stage model:
where CG Realized is a dummy variable equal to 100 if individual i realizes capital gains in year t, Ln(CG) is the natural logarithm of the SEK amount of realized capital gains of individual i in year t, and M T R is the marginal income tax rate on the labor income of individual i in year t. Equation (2) tests the effect at the extensive margin. A positive α 1
indicates that a higher labor income tax rate increases the likelihood that individuals realize
11
One potential concern is that labor income and thus the labor income tax rate could depend on accrued capital gains; that is, an individual could reduce his or her labor supply because of the expectation of capital gains. To control for this effect, I rerun the regressions using lagged marginal income tax rates. I present this robustness test below.
capital gains. Equation (3) tests the intensive margin. In this case, a positive β 1 indicates that a higher labor income tax rate increases the level of realized capital gains, conditional on their realization. Theoretical models on capital gains realizations (e.g., Constantinides, 1983) would predict that α 1 = 0 and β 1 = 0. That is, individuals base realization decisions on the absolute level of capital gains tax rates. However, if the non-parametric results hold, I would obtain positive coefficients, α 1 > 0 and β 1 > 0.
The empirical model does not include the capital gains tax rate. Due to the lack of variation in capital gains tax rates across individuals, year fixed effects α t and β t soak up the variation of capital gains tax rates over time. The inclusion of year fixed effects thus has two effects. Table 3 summarizes the regression results from estimating equations (2) and (3), using OLS.
Cross-Base Tax Sensitivity of Capital Gains
12
The results suggest that labor income taxes have a positive effect on capital gains at the intensive and extensive margins. An increase in the marginal income tax rate on earned income increases the likelihood of an individual realizing capital gains. That is, higher income tax rates are associated with more individuals realizing capital gains (extensive margin). The corresponding elasticity of the likelihood of realizing capital gains with respect to the marginal income tax rate is significant and amounts to 0.047. Even though the resulting elasticity is small, the economic effects are sizable. For example, if a taxpayer goes from the first tax bracket (31%) to the next tax bracket (51%), the likelihood of realizing capital gains increases by 1 percentage point, or 4.3% of the sample mean.
[Insert Table 3 The results for the control variables in Table 3 Otherwise the model will produce biased estimates, since both the decision to realize gains and the amount of realized gains are affected by M T R.
Robustness Tests
This section presents two robustness tests of the estimated effects. First, using M T R t in estimating equations (2) and (3) Table 4 presents the coefficient estimates and elasticities for M T R t−1 . The coefficient estimates and elasticities are still significant and somewhat larger than in my baseline tests.
Therefore, my result of a positive effect of labor income taxes on capital gains realization activity cannot be explained by reverse causality.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Second, one potential concern about the baseline results is that equation (2) is estimated using a linear probability model. Panel B of Table 4 
Cross-Base Tax Sensitivity of Dividend and Interest Income
Cross-base tax sensitivity may not only affect capital gains income but also interest and dividend income. Sweden also taxes interest and dividend income at a flat tax rate of 30% that is independent from labor income tax rates. This tax treatment creates an incomeshifting incentive from labor income taxes to capital income taxes (Pirttilä and Selin, 2011; Alstadsaeter and Jacob, 2014; le Maire and Schjerning, 2013) and has been described as the Achilles heel of Nordic dual income taxes (Sørensen, 1994) . To test whether changes in the labor income tax rate also affect the level of interest income and dividend income, I replicate the regression kink design presented in Figures 2 and 3 but use dividend income and interest income, respectively, as the dependent variables.
Panel A of Figure 4 presents the corresponding scatter plots with the earned income bin (in SEK centered around the threshold) on the horizontal axis and average dividend income on the vertical axis. Panel B uses average interest income on the vertical axis. As for capital gains, average dividend income and interest income increase in overall earned income; that is, individuals with higher earned income also generate higher dividend and interest income.
From below the kink to above the kink, the slope coefficient of the income bin increases from 0.010 to 0.023, or by over 230%. Since the difference in slope coefficients is statistically significant (t-statistic = 6.63), an increase in the marginal labor income tax rate positively affects dividend income. I find a similar result for interest income. The slope coefficient of the income bin in Panel B increases from 0.024 (below the kink) to 0.036 (above the kink), or by 49%. The increase in slope coefficients is significant at the 1% level (t-statistic = 8.35). These results show that labor income taxes also positively affect the level of dividend and interest income.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
I next rerun equation (2) and use the natural logarithm of interest income and dividend income, respectively, as dependent variables to obtain elasticity estimates. Table 5 presents the coefficient estimates and corresponding elasticities for M T R. Both models include control variables and fixed effects. The results confirm the positive cross-base elasticity of interest and dividend income with respect to the marginal labor income tax rate. The resulting elasticities are 0.10 for interest and 0.02 for dividends and are statistically significant. These elasticity estimates again correspond to small labor supply elasticities and labor income elasticities (Saez, 2010; Chetty et al., 2011; Chetty, 2012; Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz, 2012) . My results thus indicate that labor income tax rates have a positive and significant effect on interest and dividend income. Since I control for three lags of income, the cross-base elasticity is less likely to be driven by differences in overall income.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
The graphical evidence and estimation of elasticities suggest that dividend income and interest income are both sensitive to changes in labor income taxation. One potential explanation is that individuals invest in riskier assets when rebalancing their portfolios in response to increases in labor income taxes. This explanation is, unfortunately, not testable, due to a lack of portfolio information in the data. For example, individuals could shift funds from a savings account to government or corporate bonds. This would increase interest income.
Similarly, reinvestment of realized capital gains could result in a re-allocation of funds toward dividend-paying stocks, since the capital income tax rate is (perceived to be) lower than the labor income tax rate. Unfortunately, due to data limitations and a lack of information on portfolio composition, this explanation cannot be tested empirically.
Cross-Base Tax Sensitivity: Robustness to the Exclusion of the Self-Employed
One concern about my results is access to income shifting (Alstadsaeter and Jacob, 2013).
Not every taxpayer who is willing to shift income across tax bases has the opportunity to do so. Pirttilä and Selin (2011) show that income-shifting incentives of the dual income tax are captured by the self-employed. As a result, the elasticity of the taxable income of the self-employed decreases from 0.43-0.53 to 0.14--0.20 once intertemporal income shifting is controlled for (le Maire and Schjerning, 2013). To ensure that my results are not entirely driven by a few individuals responding to tax changes (e.g., Chetty et al., 2013) , I rerun all the tests, excluding the self-employed.
[Insert Table 6 about here] Table 6 presents the resulting elasticities with respect to the marginal income tax rate.
Column (1) shows the results for the likelihood of realizing capital gains. In Columns (2) through (4), I use the amount of realized capital gains, interest income, and dividend income, respectively, as the dependent variables. The estimated coefficients confirm the results from Tables 3 and 5 . The M T R coefficients are similar to the baseline estimates and are statistically significant. 13 This suggests that the labor income tax rate has cross-base effects on capital gains, interest income, and dividend income. This result is not driven by self-employed individuals with access to income shifting.
13
Note that the coefficient estimate for Ln(CG) amounts to 0.0013. The standard error is 0.0007, which results in a t-statistic of 1.74.
Conclusion
This paper studies the cross-base elasticity of capital gains with respect to labor income taxes.
When capital gains are taxed at a separate, proportional tax rate, this paper shows that the likelihood to realized gains and the level of capital gains is responsive to the marginal income tax rate on labor income and income from self-employment. This cross-base income elasticity also holds for interest income and dividend income.
My results have two main implications. The elasticity of taxable income with respect to marginal tax rates typically relates to the labor supply and labor income (see Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz, 2012 , for a literature review). The results presented in this paper imply that labor income taxes can have spillover effects on other tax bases that are taxed at separate and independent tax schedules. Therefore, the implications of the elasticity of taxable income on the deadweight loss of a labor income tax (Feldstein, 1995 (Feldstein, , 1999 are affected by tax avoidance and tax evasion (Chetty, 2009 ) and by the cross-base tax sensitivity of capital income to labor income taxes. Hence, modeling the excess burden of an income tax should comprise all income sources that are potentially affected by labor income taxes.
Second, prior empirical work studies the lock-in effect of capital gains taxes (Feldstein, Slemrod, and Yitzhaki, 1980; Auten and Clotfelter, 1982; Poterba, 1987; Auerbach, 1988; Bergstresser and Poterba, 2002; Ivković, Poterba, and Weisbenner, 2005) . Capital gains realization decisions are not only affected by capital gains tax rates. The tax rate on labor income additionally affects capital gains realization behavior. Many countries, such as the United States, Japan, and Germany, have separate tax schedules for capital gains income.
Therefore, the lock-in effect depends on the level of capital gains taxes and, to some extent, on the level of labor income taxes. My findings show that labor income taxes have a lock-out effect. Age is the taxpayer's age in years, M arried is a dummy equal to 100 if the individual is married and zero otherwise, T own is a dummy equal to 100 for individuals residing in towns (less than 10,000 inhabitants) and zero otherwise, City is an indicator variable equal to 100 for individuals residing in cities (more than 10,000 inhabitants) and zero otherwise, Capital is a dummy equal to 100 for individuals residing in the county's capital and zero otherwise, M ove is a dummy equal to 100 if the individual moved from one municipality to another during year t and zero otherwise, Household Size is the number of family members in the household, HS Inc (HS Dec) is a dummy equal to 100 if the household size increases (decreases) from t − 1 to t and zero otherwise, BusInc is a dummy equal to 100 if the individual reports income from self-employment and zero otherwise, and SocAss (P ension) is a dummy equal to 100 if the individual receives social assistance (pension) and zero otherwise. 
Panel A: Capital Gains Variables
